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In George Eliot’s Silas Marner (1861), the men at the Rainbow debate over whether 
or not there is a ghost at the Warren stables. Further, they weigh in on whether a 
ghost, even if it did exist, would want “ignorant folk” to believe in it. With Silas’s 
unnoticed entrance into the bar, and with his apparition-like countenance, Eliot 
suggests that ghosts aren’t actually all that discriminating as to who they want to 
believe in them—they just want to be remembered. Silas, of course, is not a ghost, 
but “ghosts,” or presences associated with the past, do haunt many characters in the 
text. And these ghosts, if ignored, give every reason for people such as those at the 
Rainbow to be wary of them. Raveloe is also inhabited by an apparition from the 
future: Eliot herself, as a narrative presence. But Eliot would rather embrace Raveloe 
than haunt it. In fact, her visit is evidence of the continuing influence of old ways of 
thinking—of ghosts—on her own life. Knowing intimately the increasing prospects 
for happiness moderns like her have in an age where seemingly anyone can rise to 
success, and knowing how different her situation and beliefs that sustain it are from 
those of the past, she is not be able to shake off the feeling that she has earned 
punishment for being unfaithful to her heritage. In her unfaithfulness, she is like her 
character Godrey Cass. But perhaps—her vicious attack on him notwithstanding—
Eliot is more like the diabolically cunning and daring Dunstan, in imagining though 
her creation Silas Marner a stratagem for appeasing the ancestral ghosts. By showing 
both that she has not forgotten them and that she believes they must be 
remembered—lest the present prove degenerate!—Eliot placates internal persecutors, 
but only so as to buy time until she is ready to banish them from her mind 
altogether! We look first to signs of agitation in the narrator in a text otherwise crafted 
by a sympathetic but judicious mind, for evidence that Eliot fears she is blameworthy 
for being an egoistic, willful modern. 
When Mr. Macey argues “[a]s if ghos’es ’ud want to be believed in by anybody so 
ignirant” (Eliot 54), Eliot, with Silas’s ghost-like appearance at the Rainbow, is able to 
suggest otherwise, because his statement could be contradicted by experience. 
Experience, often in the form of sudden and dramatic changes to everyday life, is 
most often used by Eliot to show how unpredictable nature is. Eliot’s conception of 
nature likely strikes us as realistic for it being of persistent interaction and change. In 
Raveloe, or with simple, reclusive people such as Silas, Eliot shows us that because 
“life [is] [. . .] breathed on variously by multitudinous currents, from the winds of 
heaven to the thoughts of men[,] [. . .] [which] are for ever moving and crossing each 
other, with incalculable results” (23), neither the town nor its inhabitants can long 
hold life or nature at bay. Realistic-seeming, too, is Eliot’s characterization of systems 
or codes of thought as ideologies particular to a person or people at a particular time 
and place. She treats those who cling to regular and patterned ways of thinking with 
sympathy, but in general shows rigid ways of thinking as imposing a form onto 
reality which Reality either subverts at their user’s expense (as with Silas and his ritual 
of leaving his door unlocked), or which encloses their users in walled-in misery (as is 
the case with Nancy’s “unalterable little code[s]” [156]). 
Yet despite this tendency, she herself expresses a tenuous-seeming maxim in the 
text, namely, that burglars are dull-minded, which she insists is almost always true 
(39). Furthermore, Silas Marner is itself a rhetorical argument for judging the degree to 
which people are rewarded and punished in life as depending entirely on how selfishly 
they behave. It advances the same sort of argument we often actually expect to see in a 
fairy tale, and it reflects a world-view which Dunstan—the character Eliot makes a 
skeleton of—“deprecate[s]” (74). 
Eliot is concerned to show how Godrey, Dunstan, and Silas think of themselves 
and how they fare in life. Godrey, at book’s end, has been both punished and 
rewarded. He is admonished in the text for not having the “moral courage” to own 
up to his marriage to Molly to Nancy. Yet not informing Nancy did not prevent the 
marriage, nor did it entirely ruin his prospects for happiness: he fails to make claim to 
Eppie, but clearly has found happiness in marriage. With “tenderness,” he says to 
Nancy (175), “I got you in spite of all [,] [. . .] and yet I’ve been grumbling and uneasy 
because I hadn’t something else” (175), adding, “as if I deserved it” (175). Godrey’s 
brother Dunstan is judged by Eliot for his demoniac cleverness, and is punished 
more severely; for whereas Godrey at least had been modest enough to think he 
deserved punishment, Dunstan extorts his brother and preys upon his neighbors 
without any self-reproach. To be rewarded with an entirely happy present and with 
promising future prospects, according to the logic of Silas Marner, demands the 
“humble sort of acquiescence in what was held to be good” (142) that Silas has. 
Eliot, who discerns when the landlord, for example, uses “analogical logic” (54), 
clearly knows and believes that reflection can help one avoid mistaking norms or 
habits of thought for universally valid truths. Reflecting on “[p]oor Marner” (14), she 
tells us that “[t]o people accustomed to reason about the forms in which their 
religious feeling has incorporated itself, it is difficult to enter into that simple, 
untaught state of mind in which the form and the feeling have never been severed by 
an act of reflection” (14). According to psychoanalyst Stanley Greenspan, however, 
even those used to reasoning things out and reflecting before acting, may find that in 
certain circumstances they are unable to make use of these higher-order thinking 
processes. He writes: 
 
The emotional guides to our thinking can also lead us astray during extreme 
states of anxiety, depression, fear, anger, or the like. At such times our 
emotions become so overwhelming that we are unable to fine-tune our ideas. 
Thoughts become polarized, rigid, fixed, while inflexible beliefs dominate the 
mind. (34) 
 
Greenspan, who believes that each of our sensory perceptions is “[labelled] by [. . 
.] both its physical properties [. . .] and by the emotional qualities we connect with it” 
(21), and that abstractions are created by “fus[ing] various emotional experiences into 
a single, integrated concept” (26), would disagree with Eliot’s contention that 
reflection severs form from feeling; to him, reflection, instead, helps us “modulate our 
emotions” (22). And since even highly abstract concepts like religion are actually 
constituted by emotions (27), no less than the untaught and simple, the reasoning 
philosopher is not able to exempt herself from emotional influence. Those who seek 
pure exemption, in fact—and so not just those overrun by base desires—are exactly 
those to be expected to suffer from extreme lapses of self-control, for their flight no 
doubt owes to their inexperience in successfully managing what are, of course, 
inevitable emotional upsets. 
Perhaps the reason that Eliot, then—at least with the dispersal of rewards and 
punishments is concerned—suddenly conceives of nature as predictable and orderly, 
that it ensures that there are, to Dunstan’s huge misfortune, “unpleasant 
consequences” to people’s actions (73), when otherwise nature is vicarious and 
unfathomable, is because Eliot herself, with this matter, has not yet managed to 
entirely free herself from that simple way of thinking too bonded to emotional 
arousal to enable reflective thought. That is, while writing, when she brings to mind 
clear examples of egoism, of people’s intention to immodestly satisfy themselves, 
feeling guilty f or her own superior intelligence and success, she becomes so agitated she 
cannot manage that controlled, calibrated state of mind required to notice, and 
therefore be capable of altering, her inclination to associate ambition with hubris, and 
see vengeance visited upon all the guilty trespassers. 
Eliot, we know, does not always distinguish herself from simpletons; she 
frequently tells us—often including all humanity in her sweeping generalizations—
that we all share some of the mental habits of the simple and honest members of the 
Raveloe community. But suspiciously, the exceptions—those such as William Dane 
and Dunstan Cass, who consider themselves exceptional, and who expect status and 
riches—are also those whose gains she insists on characterizing as ill-gotten. William, 
whom his peers see as being “so dazzled by his own light as to hold himself wiser 
than his teachers” (10), displaces Silas as a revered brother with a plot that involves 
stealing from the deacon. Dunstan, who “swaggers” (34), who is always on the 
lookout “to take [. . .] someone in” (34), refers to Silas as an “old staring simpleton” 
(39). William and Dunstan are youngsters who not only disrespect their elders—the 
teachers, with William, the elderly, with Dunstan—but are indifferent to their fates 
once they have left them behind in pursuit of further “petty egoistic” (156) 
acquisitions. Dunstan possesses a singular ability to arouse Eliot. Eliot, who seems 
to find every way to find virtue in the simplest of minds, finds none at all when she 
estimates Dunstan’s as dull. But is this really how she thinks of him? We note how 
she attaches this label just after his dismissing Silas as but an old simpleton. Further, 
while the sequence that has him ride his horse to death and burglar Silas shows him 
as an impulse-driven, unthinking fool, previously Dunstan not only showed 
considerable cunning in his mastery over his brother but also showed himself a 
competent master of his emotional state. Considering that Eliot characterizes 
Dunstan’s manipulation of Godrey so that it seems much more diabolically clever 
than miscreant but otherwise dull, spite and vengeance, not reasoned fair 
commentary, clearly is moving her pen here. 
Previously Eliot showed Dunstan as a risk-taker, but a thoughtful and intelligent 
one, emphasizing his own self-control and Godrey’s lack thereof. While Godrey 
succumbs to a “movement of compunction [. . .] which was a blight on his life,” it is 
Dunstan who sees “in his brother’s degrading marriage the means of gratifying at 
once his jealous hate and his cupidity” (31), and seizes upon his opportunity. Godrey 
prefers to intimidate rather than reason with his brother. Godrey, “mastered by [. . .] 
fear,” would flog [Dunstan] [. . .] within an inch of his life” (29). Dunstan, in 
contrast, maintains, even while under physical threat from threat, “an air of 
unconcern” (29). His insouciance owes to having sufficient insight into his brother’s 
ways that he can simply “wait” (29) for Godrey to stop resisting, and then lead him 
to accept his terms. If Eliot was to make a fair assessment of Dunstan’s intelligence 
and impulse control at this point in the narrative, she really could do no better than 
to suggest, as Godrey does, that he could have “more sharpness” (27). But even in 
this she would be in error, because one of Dunstans’s goals—unfortunate as it surely 
is—is to agitate his brother as much as possible. He braves a trial, risks error (or 
“oversho[oting] his mark” [27]), but thereby better knows just how well he has 
caught his brother out. Ultimately, we note, Godrey acquiesces; Dunstan 
accomplishes his goal, and need not fear Godrey. But Dunstan is not, however, safe 
from Eliot; and it is she, incapable of the restraint that even Godrey manages, who 
ultimately “knock[s] [. . .] [Dunstan] down” (28). 
What Dunstan in particular represents to Eliot is someone who “forsake[s] a 
decent craft that he may pursue the gentilities of a profession to which nature never 
called him” (74). Dunstan, the second son, lives a gentry-life of drink, horseriding, 
and leisure, and has his elder brother contemplate the consequences of becoming a 
soldier (28). In his presumption, Dunstan is similar to William Dane, who, though 
favored, is not looked upon with quite the reverence as those thought selected by 
God (such as Silas) for a special purpose are. As with Dunstan, William, when he 
devises means to benefit at Silas’s expense, betrays the bond that ought to exist 
between brothers, and both of these “betrayers” are actually similar in nature to Eliot 
and her contemporaries. Mid-Victorians, as with Dunstan, and as with later born 
sons, rather than having clear roles and identities thrust upon them, have instead the 
nebulous freedom to shape their fates themselves. Elder sons have an obvious link 
to the past in that they would—as with Godrey—“come into the land someday” 
(24). They are more easily imagined—again, as with Godrey (and as Eliot herself 
imagines him)—“as having an essentially domestic nature” (31), and are thus not 
subject (as Eliot imagines Dunstan) to wanderlust. Eliot, like Dunstan and William, 
possesses the intelligence to, if she should desire, manipulate those about her for her 
own benefit. Moreover, they all have sufficient will and self-confidence to accept the 
risks involved in pursuing ambitious goals. In a complex, modern, ever-changing 
society, this degree of intelligence and will would be necessary, not just to succeed but 
simply to meaningfully participate, and would have been imagined by Eliot and her 
contemporaries,  the norm for their age. But perhaps the habitual association of this 
sort of intelligence as egoistic and self-serving—as “bad”—afflicts people like Eliot 
sufficiently that it still leads to attempts at penance, variant enough to include the likes 
of Eliot’s attempt to punish her likeness in her writing, and necessitates efforts to 
exonerate themselves from charges they belong to a dangerously degenerate age far 
removed in purity from the “honest[y] [belonging to] [. . .] their ancestors” (20). 
We know that Eliot is concerned to show how intrusive past events can be upon 
our present existence. Eliot tells us that Nancy “filled the vacant moments by living 
inwardly, over and over again, through all her remembered experience” (154), an 
experience Eliot characterizes as a “morbid habit of mind” (154). And with Godrey, 
Eliot shows us someone who cannot, simply by changing his patterns of thinking, 
free himself from torment. For even if Godrey was, with the gracious assistance of 
time, to forget his past, the past has not chosen to forget or forgive him! Eliot conjures up 
Molly as a revenant, as an embodied ghost who returns from the dead to punish 
Godrey. The passage of time, forgetfulness, actually works to Molly’s advantage, for 
she wants nothing more than to catch Godrey just when he feels safe enough from 
harm to venture out to pursue a relationship with Nancy. Eliot wishes Godrey had 
the moral courage to tell Nancy about his marriage to Molly earlier than he in fact 
does; but considering it is difficult to believe Eliot imagines this would not have 
ruined his chances with her, using his confession of wrongfulness toward Molly to 
express the wrongfulness of her own neglect of her past would seem untenable, a false-
confession—a lie. Eliot is, however, trying to demonstrate to internal persecutors, to 
ghosts nesting in her mind, that with Silas Marner she is remembering her 
forefathers—her “neighbors” from the past—and that she not only values them but, 
given the chance, would readily stand up for them. 
Eliot defends the Raveloe inhabitants both through subtle plot contrivances and 
through impassioned narrative rants. The members of the Raveloe community are 
described as simple and honest, but at times, also as vengeful and barbaric. At the 
beginning of Eliot’s account, it is only fear, born of superstition, which prevents Silas 
“from the persecution that his singularities might have drawn upon him” (9). And 
near book’s end, Silas’s isolation helps protect Eppie from “the lowering influences 
of [. . .] village talk and habits” (146). The result is that, since we never do witness 
their persecution of Silas, nor do we see Eppie grow into anything other than a pure 
child, we are most likely to associate the typical Raveloean with the benevolent Dolly. 
Eliot also has the chance to actively defend Nancy (apparently from some of the 
readers she has “invited along”) when she seeks to reprove “grammatically fair ones,” 
who cannot fathom how her “feelings can at all resemble theirs” (93). And Eliot 
sometimes even sounds like a proud member of the Raveloe community, especially 
when she mimics, with her diatribe against those who seek more than they were by 
nature ordained to possess, the Raveloean hatred for those who “wish to be better 
than the ‘common run’” (80). 
With Silas Marner, Eliot proves to herself she is more the favored who embraces 
the past than a truant concerned to disparage it. As with Eppie’s soothing remarks to 
her father when he fears he may lose her upon marriage, that he is not so much losing 
a daughter as gaining a son, Eliot tells herself that as a successful modern writer she is 
not detaching herself from the norms of her forefather but rather attaching, with a 
supposed respect for old folkways in her writing, a new age to her own. So doing, she 
hopes to replace her habitual conception of those “who ha[ve] more cunning than 
honest folks [. . .] [not using] that cunning in a neighbourly way” (77), with her 
preferred sense that “mind[s] [. . . ] of extraordinary acuteness must necessarily 
contemplate the doings of their fallible fellow-men” (102). She hopes, as proved true 
with Eppie, having placated her “relations,” she might better enjoy her own 
refinement and difference. 
It is even possible that Eliot may not, at heart, truly respect her forefathers. 
Indeed, there are signs in the text that she thinks the poverty of “ordinary farmers” 
(68)—the prototypical inhabitant of our pastoral past—a condition they both could 
and should have freed themselves from. We feel this when she draws our attention to 
how similar in nature the Raveloe farmers are to Squire Cass, remarking that because 
they have “slouched their way through life with a consciousness of being in the 
vicinity of their ‘betters,’ [they] want that self-possession and authoritativeness of 
voice and carriage which belong[s] to a man who thought of superiors as remote 
existences” (68). Perhaps for Eliot, Raveloe is akin to the brown pot Silas keeps by his 
hearth: it is be kept and tended to only while its mistreatment might “bruise [her] [. . 
.] roots” (142)—that is, while its removal or replacement would disturb her. But just 
as Silas might one day come to experience his precious relic—the last remaining piece 
at book’s end of his dwelling’s old furnishings—as but a plain old pot he’s too long 
kept near his side, Eliot might come to see Raveloe—or, rather, the composite of 
place, time, and people Raveloe represents—as irrelevant, and forget, now, exactly why 
she once placed so much interest in it. Considering Eliot’s previous loving sentiment, 
thoughts, and words, this would be a considerable betrayal of her forefathers, but as 
she herself tells us, “language is a stream that is almost sure to smack of a mingled 
soil” (78).    
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